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tem. Without that, they provide 
little security advantage. In other 
words, routine, random recounts 
are part of the system, and must 
be treated as such.
How, then, do we protect sys-
tems? The answer is straightfor-
ward: each component must be 
evaluated independently and pro-
tected as necessary. Beware the 
easy answers, such as deploying 
stronger encryption while ignor-
ing, say, vulnerable end points; 
that’s too much like looking un-
der the streetlamp for lost keys, 
not because they’re likely to be 
there but because it’s an easy place 
to search. Remember, too, that 
people and processes are system 
components as well, and often 
the weakest ones—think about 
phishing, but also about legiti-
mate emails that are structurally 
indistinguishable from phishing 
attacks. I’m not saying you should 
ignore one weakness because you 
can’t a!ord to address another se-
rious one—but in general, your 
defenses should be balanced. Af-
ter that, of course, you have to 
evaluate the security of the entire 
system. Components interact, not 
always in benign ways, and there 
might be gaps you haven’t "lled.
S ystems are far more power-ful and #exible than isolated 
computers, but they’re also more 
vulnerable; our security practices 
must recognize this. 
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will sometimes help. More accu-
rately, though, everyone is wrong: 
their ideas might be part of the 
solution, but there is no single 
answer. Security is a systems prop-
erty; attacking the problem piece-
meal will lead only to frustration. 
What do I mean by a “systems 
property”? Just that—what mat-
ters is not whether any individual 
piece is strong or weak but rather 
whether the bad guys can get in 
somewhere. By de"nition, a sys-
tem is composed of many di!erent 
components; any of them could be 
weak. As I tell my students, “You 
don’t go through strong security, 
you go around it.”
People ignore this all too of-
ten. They’ll spend millions of 
zorkmids on the latest and great-
est VPN but ignore the fact that 
the laptops their employees use 
to connect are frequently used by 
their employees’ teenagers to visit 
dubious places on the Net. They’ll 
install a "rewall with 17-factor 
authentication but then forget 
they’ve made access to email so 
inconvenient that employees will 
simply forward their corporate 
address to some ad-driven free-
mail system.
Nowhere is this tendency more 
evident than in voting schemes. 
Over the years, handwritten paper 
ballots have been replaced suc-
cessively by o$cial, preprinted 
ballots, lever and punch-card ma-
chines, direct-recording electron-
ic (DRE) systems, DRE systems 
with  paper trails, and—now— 
optically scanned, computer- 
prepared, paper ballots. Successive 
schemes have always been touted 
as “more secure” (as well as faster 
and cheaper), but are they? Each 
system has had its failings. Bal-
lot boxes can be stu!ed. Lever 
machines jam (sometimes inten-
tionally) and are easily readable 
in mid-election by anyone who 
removes the cover. Arguably, the 
weaknesses of punch-card sys-
tems determined the outcome of 
the 2000 US presidential election. 
DRE systems are heir to all of the 
weaknesses of software. And opti-
cally scanned paper ballots? They 
illustrate my point.
The putative advantage of any 
paper-based voting system is that 
there’s something to recount, by 
hand if necessary. But when are 
recounts “necessary”? The stan-
dard answer, often enshrined 
in law, is that recounts are done 
only in close races. That’s insuf-
"cient—recounts of a random 
subset of precincts have to be 
done routinely, as a check on the 
correctness of the automated sys-
P eriodically, someone knows what to do about cybersecurity. It might be encryption, "re-walls, patches, formal methods, more open source, less open source, better law enforce-
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